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La Révolution est un bloc? Wallace on Affirmation and Regret 
James Lenman 
This is my version of a paper to be published in the Journal of Applied Philosophy. Please always 
refer to the version published there when citing or quoting. 
1 
dŚĞƚǁŽǁŽƌůĚǁĂƌƐŽĨ ? ? ?-  ?ĂŶĚ ‘ ? ?-45 were terrible things. An ocean of suffering and death 
overwhelmed Europe and much of Asia. It would be better if they had never happened.  And yet it is 
perhaps difficult seriously to wish for that. Here is a safe bet. These wars had the effect of massively 
disrupting and displacing the lives of enormous numbers of people.  In so doing they had a huge 
effect on where people, especially young adult people at the age people typically marry and start 
families, were living and when, whom they met, when they married, when they had children.  These 
disruptive effects were plausibly so huge that, at least in Europe, a huge difference was made to the 
identities of people now alive. But for these devastating wars most of us would never have existed 
and other, quite distinct people would have existed instead. So in wishing these wars had not 
occurred I am, in effect, wishing that I (very probably), and all or almost all of those I love and care 
for, had never been born. But I surely do not wish that.  
I learn that you have been doing me some grave wrong. Perhaps you have been supplying my 
teenage son with class A drugs. I fly into a rage and rush from the house to find and confront you. 
Just after I leave the house it explodes. (Gas leak. Who knew?) I might have been cross with you for 
selling my son heroin but now look, it is only because of you doing that that I am alive now. 
^ŚŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚ/ďĞŐƌĂƚĞĨƵů ?If I welcome the fact that I survived the explosion then, given that that fact 
depends ŽŶƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚǇŽƵŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƐĞůůŝŶŐůŝƚƚůĞ<ĞǀŝŶĚƌƵŐƐ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚ/now welcome the fact 
that you have been selling little Kevin drugs?  
:ĂǇtĂůůĂĐĞ ?ƐƌŝĐŚĂŶĚĨĂƐĐŝŶĂƚŝŶŐŶĞǁďŽŽŬ The View From Here1 is largely devoted to wrestling with 
just such puzzles as these . More precisely, the book is largely about two attitudes Wallace calls 
affirmation and regret. It is important to be quite clear what these are. To affirm an action is to 
prefer that it have been performed. To affirm a situation is to prefer that it obtain and to take an 
attitude of affirmation to a person or thing is to prefer that it exist, with all the qualities it actually 
has, rather than not. But Wallace wants to stress that, as he conceives them, such attitudes of 
ĂĨĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂƌĞ “ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ-ůŝŬĞ ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐĂŶĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚĂƚƚŚĞƉĂƐƚĂŶĚŶŽƚ ĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇƚŽ
an action can be intention-like. In ƚŚĞĐĂƐĞǁŚĞƌĞǁŚĂƚŝƐĂĨĨŝƌŵĞĚŝƐĂŶĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂŶĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
own, we can underƐƚĂŶĚĂĨĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂƐ “ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐůŝŬĞƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ
originaůůǇůĞĚŽŶĞƚŽƉĞƌĨŽƌŵŝƚ ? ?(66) So I woke up today with a positive attitude to travelling into 
work that amounted to an intention. We ĐĂŶ ?ƚĐĂůůŝƚƚŚĂƚŶŽǁƚŚĂƚ/ ?ve gone and done it, but I 
ŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚĐŚĂŶŐĞĚŵǇŵŝŶĚĂďŽƵƚ that positive attitude, it has merely taken on a new shape as 
affirmation. We could think of it as a kind of hypothetical willing. If I wake up now and discover it is 
still last night and what seemed like today ƐŽĨĂƌŝƐĂůůĂĚƌĞĂŵ ?/ ?ll get up and travel to work as 
planned, just in virtue of this state of mind. This way of thinking about affirmation (and regret) 
matters for Wallace because, to get his central argument off the ground, he needs affirmation (and 
                                                          
1
 Oxford: OUP, 2013. All page reference s are to this book unless stated otherwise. 
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regret) to be subject to just the same coherence constraints as intentions are and mere wishes, 
pretty plainly, are not.  You cannot, Wallace insists, affirm something that you also regret at least 
ǁŚĞŶďǇƌĞŐƌĞƚǁĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚŚĞĐĂůůƐ “Ăůů-ŝŶ ?ƌĞŐƌĞƚ ?dŽĂůů-in regret an action is to prefer, in 
the same committed way, that it not have been performed. To all-in regret a situation is to prefer 
that it not obtain and to take an attitude of all-in regret to a person or thing is to prefer that it not 
exist . These attitudes of affirmation and regret, he writes, cannot be coherently combined (70) 
towards the same objects. 
Of course they can be coherently combined towards different ŽďũĞĐƚƐ ?^ŽůŽŶŐ ?ŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ ?ĂƐ “ƚŚĞ
objects that are distinguished are conceptually and causally independent from each other, to a 
ĚĞŐƌĞĞƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƚŽĞŶĂďůĞƵƐƚŽĨŽƌŵĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĨĂĐƚƵĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐĂďŽƵƚŽŶĞŽďũĞĐƚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?
(70) But we cannot, he goes on to insist, do this in cases where the things we would distinguish are 
necessarily connected either conceptually or causally. If X is a causally necessary condition for Y, 
then we cannot affirm the one and all-in regret the other.  
Except when we can. For there is a further qualification. There are cases of conditional affirmation or 
regret where the past circumstances that caused what we affirm are  “screened off ? in the appraisal 
of individual actions  
because actions are themselves responses to a set of circumstances that confront the agent 
as a matter of facticity. At the moment of the action, certain things have to be taken as 
ŐŝǀĞŶ ?ŝŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞĂŐĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽǁĞƌƚŽĂĨĨĞĐƚŽŶĞǁĂǇŽƌĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?
the fact that the house is on fire or that a promise has been made. The deliberative task is to 
select among the options that it is now open to the agent to perform given the fixed 
circumstances that constitute the deliberative context. We therefore screen off those fixed 
consequences in retrospective assessment of the action, focusing on the question of 
whether the action was or was not worthy of affirmation, given the circumstances that 
define its immediate context. (74-5)  
This happens when I am able to admire the heroism of the firefighter occasioned by the fire which 
itself I do not of course affirm. 
There are, however, ƐĂǇƐtĂůůĂĐĞ ?ĐĂƐĞƐǁŚĞƌĞ “ĂĨĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂƐƐƵŵĞƐĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂŶĚƵŶĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů
ĨŽƌŵ ? ?,ĞƌĞ P “KŶĞĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŵĞƌĞůǇĂĨĨŝƌŵƚŚŽƐĞŽďũĞĐƚƐ ?ŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĐĂƵƐĂůĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ
for them obtained; rather one is glad on balance that those objects are in fact part of the history of 
ƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƚĂŬŝŶŐŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƚŚĞƚŽƚĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚŝŶŐƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ? ?(75) This sort of 
ƵŶĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŝƐ ?ŚĞƐĂǇƐ ? “ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶ ? ?/ƚŝƐĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞ “ ?ŝ ?Ĩ
we are attached to an individual or project, then we will typically affirm the direct objects of our 
attachments in a distinctively unconditional way. ? ? ? ? ? 
/ ?ĚƉĂƵƐĞŚĞƌĞƚŽƐĂǇĨŝƌƐƚŽĨĨƚŚĂƚ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬƚŚŝƐĂƚůů obvious. Suppose I love you. That is a very 
common, natural and certainly very important state of mind. I am glad, I say, that you exist. But this 
might mean more than one thing. It might mean I prefer your existing to your never having existed. 
But it might also mean, something different, I want you to continue existing and perhaps, again 
something different, that I am glad you have continued to exist thus far. These different things can 
ĐŽŵĞĂƉĂƌƚĂƐŝƐĞĂƐŝůǇƐĞĞŶŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶůŝĨĞ ?/ŵŝŐŚƚƵŶĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇĂĨĨŝƌŵŵǇůŝĨĞĂŶĚ
be very happy I came into being without having any desire to remain in being if, for example, I am 
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old and ailing and lonesome and think that, while I have had a wonderful life, the stuff that made it 
wonderful is all now in the past. Or of course I might cling stubbornly to a disappointing life that I see 
little reason to affirm. I rather worry that it is because Wallace rather runs these things together (see 
esp. pp. 187-197; p. 255) ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇǁĂŶƚŝŶŐy ?ƐĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚǁĂŶƚŝŶŐy ?Ɛ continued existing, that 
he perhaps overstates the importance of the very particular sort of affirmation that concerns him.  
Like perhaps most people who have given the matter much thought, I have mixed feelings about the 
&ƌĞŶĐŚZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?/ ?ŵƉůĞĂƐĞĚƚŚĂƚ&ƌĂŶĐĞƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚŽƵƌďŽŶĂďƐŽůƵƚŝƐŵ, abolished feudalism and 
embraced the democratic and liberal ideals that have informed and inspired much of what seems to 
me best in subsequent European political culture.. But I am appalled by the September Massacres 
and the Terror and the current of ghastly fanaticism that chillingly adumbrates the way more the 
idealism of more recent, twentieth century revolutions has so often been poisonously corrupted into 
murderous madness. Just such ambivalence was challenged by Georges Clemenceau, speaking in the 
French Chamber of Deputies in 1891. There Clemenceau attacked those who would say, on 
ĞǆĂŵŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? “J'accepte ceci, et je rejette cela! ?ĂŶĚŐŽĞƐŽŶƚŽĐůĂŝŵ P “Messieurs, que 
nous le voulions ou non, que cela nous plaise ou que cela nous choque, la Révolution française est 
un bloc. ?2 The thought is very much in the spirit of Wallace on affirmation, as his developing 
argument makes clear Pŝƚ ?ƐĂƉĂĐŬĂŐĞ deal, you affirm or reject the whole thing. Perhaps the 
understanding of affirmation as intention-like helps again here. Consider a more extravagant variant 
on my dreamt travelling to work example above,: a fantasy scenario where a powerful supernatural 
being has set back the clock to the beginning of 1789 (cf. 63) and placed you, well-briefed, let us 
suppose, in modern history, before a switch that will, as if magically, allow you to determine 
whether the familiar Revolutionary chain of events is to unfold as you have read it described or 
whether it is to simply be disappeared from history. Of course it would be impossible here to know 
ǁŚĂƚǇŽƵƐŚŽƵůĚĚŽďĞĐĂƵƐĞǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĨĂĐƚƵĂů
Revolution-free world. (Shit ŚĂƉƉĞŶƐ ?ŶĚŝƚ ?s a safe bet that, when that shit ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŚĂƉƉĞŶ ?
different shit happens instead.) Be that as it may, the point here is that, when we contemplate this 
scenario, the Revolution is indeed a block, to be chosen or refused as a package deal. And there is 
certainly such a mental state as the state of affirming a thing in a sense that commits one to some 
such counterfactual intention. But again I think we can legitimately be sceptical about attaching any 
very central importance of that very particular kind of affirmation. Other brands are surely available 
that allow us to make abundant sense of the sort of eminently sensible affirmatory cherry-picking 
Clemenceau deplored.   
2. 
Wallace holds that affirmation and regret can come apart from moral and other normative 
judgements. For Wallace (see esp. chapter 4) it is quite possible for someone to think: 
/ŽƵŐŚƚŶŽƚƚŽŚĂǀĞĚŽŶĞƚŚĂƚďƵƚ/ ?ŵĂǁĨƵůůǇŐůĂĚ/ĚŝĚ ? 
                                                          
2
  ? “/ĂĐĐĞƉƚƚŚŝƐĂŶĚ/ƌĞũĞĐƚƚŚĂƚ ? ? “'ĞŶƚůĞŵĞŶ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌǁĞůŝŬĞŝƚŽƌŶŽƚ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚƉůĞĂƐĞƐŽƌ
ƐŚŽĐŬƐƵƐ ?ƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŝƐĂďůŽĐŬ ? ? ?Quoted,  “'ĞŽƌŐĞƐůĞŵĞŶĐĞĂƵ ? ? ? ? ? ? P “La Révolution 
ĞƐƚƵŶďůŽĐ “ ? ? ?ũĂŶǀŝĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂƚƚŚĞǁĞďƐŝƚĞŽĨƚŚĞAssemblée Nationale (http://www2.assemblee-
nationale.fr/decouvrir-l-assemblee/histoire/grands-moments-d-eloquence/georges-clemenceau-
1891-la-revolution-est-un-bloc-29-janvier-1891)  
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That might seem puzzling in the way clear-eyed akrasia seems puzzling. For sincere and serious 
normative judgement might seem to entail some kind of intention-like commitment of the will of 
just the sort that Wallace appeals to in characterising affirmation and regret. At pp. 173-174, 
Wallace raises this kind of concern but in a way that suggests it is only a problem for expressivist 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐŽĨƚŚĞŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ?/ ?ŵŶŽƚƐƵƌĞŝĨƚŚĂƚ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚ ?ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶŝĨŝƚŝƐ ?ŝƚǁŽŶ ?ƚĚŽŵƵĐŚƚŽ
tame the worry if, as I am disposed to believe, expressivist understandings of the normative are true. 
But how deep is the problem? ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚǁŽŽĨtĂůůĂĐĞ ?ƐŽǁŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ ?/ŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ ? ? ? ?ĨĨ ?ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ
cashes in their life savings and goes on a gambling spree. Against all the odds they get lucky and are 
able to retire with considerable wealth. They can then perfectly coherently think, that what they did 
was horribly stupid, something they really should not have done and at the same time, be 
ŝŵŵĞŶƐĞůǇƉůĞĂƐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĚŝĚŝƚ ?dŚĂƚ ?ƐĞĂƐǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚŚĞƌĞ ?ŝŶĂĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ
like this where we are concerned with normative appraisal, is properly supposed to be subjective, 
relative to the epistemic circumstances of the agent. Given what I knew before I did what I did, what 
I did was almost certain to end in disaster. So I was a fool to do it. But it ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚĞŶĚŝŶ disaster. So 
thank heaven I did it. That looks perfectly coherent. In the second example (98ff) you promise to 
drive me to the airport.
3
  zŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚ ?zŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚƐŚŽǁ ?zŽƵďƌĞĂŬǇŽƵƌƉƌŽŵŝƐĞĂŶĚůĞƚŵĞĚŽǁŶĂŶĚ
have precious little to say in your defence when I quiz you as to why. But thank goodness you did. 
Because you broke your promise I never boarded the plane. And the plane went on to crash, killing 
everyone on board. Again this is surely straightforward enough. You are blameworthy for breaking 
your promise which you ought not to have broken (in that subjective sense that is most 
appropriately relevant to contexts of appraisal and blame).  But thank goodness you did:  you saved 
my life.  You were wrong to act as you did, given what you then knew, but, had you known what we 
now know, you would plausibly have been right. And we do now know what we now know so we are 
all jolly pleased you let me down, though of course we may, consistently with that, think less well of 
you as a consequence. In both cases new information about the consequences of what is done make 
it sensible to affirm in retrospect actions that it would have been  W and was - stupid or wrong to 
affirm at the time. 
Compare  the second of the two examples with which I began. Because you have supplied my child 
with hard drugs, I find myself with a reason to leave my house just before it explodes. It was quite 
wrong for you to supply my child with hard drugs given the information available at the time. How 
about given the information available now? Well, then it was still quite wrong. Because for you to 
supply my child my drugs was really quite terrible even if probably  less terrible in its consequences 
than for him to lose his father in an explosion. Had you known my house was about to blow up, you 
could have got me to leave by supplying drugs to my boy and contriving for me to find out just at the 
right time to have me rush out of the door before the explosion. But that would be a ridiculous way 
of achieving that result which you could just as easily have achieved in countless other, far more 
ŝŶŶŽĐĞŶƚ ?ǁĂǇƐ ?dŚĂƚ ?ƐǁŚǇ ?ǁŚŝůĞǇŽƵŚĂǀĞƐĂǀĞĚŵǇůŝĨĞ ?/ǁŽŶ ?ƚďĞǀĞƌǇŐƌĂƚĞĨƵů ? 
I am glad you saved my life, I want to say. And I deplore what you did. In fact I want to say more. I 
want to say that I can affirm that I got out the house in time and also regret that you did what you 
did to my boy. Surely that is right. And surely it is not a problem even when we are concerned with 
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 hŶƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐůǇŶŽŶĞŽĨtĂůůĂĐĞ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐĂƌĞĂďŽƵƚŵĞ ?:> ? or you (whoever you are) but he often 
sets them up in terms of notional people he ĐĂůůƐ “ǇŽƵ ?ĂŶĚ “ŵĞ ?ĂŶĚ/ follow him in that.  
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unconditional affirmation and all-in regret. /ƚŝƐŶŽƚĂƉƌŽďůĞŵďĞĐĂƵƐĞ “ “ƚŚĞ objects that are 
distinguished are conceptually and causally independent from each other, to a degree sufficient to 
ĞŶĂďůĞƵƐƚŽĨŽƌŵĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĨĂĐƚƵĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐĂďŽƵƚŽŶĞŽďũĞĐƚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?/ ?ŵŐůĂĚ/ǁĂƐƐĂǀĞd 
and sorry you supplied my child with drugs and this is fine because I can form the perfectly coherent 
wish that I had been saved by some other means without your having done that, as might very well, 
in some counterfactual circumstances, have happened.  
The crucially slippery thing here is surely talk of what is causally necessary. Your supplying my son 
with drugs was causally necessary for my being saved: ƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ? “,ĂĚǇŽƵŶŽƚƐƵƉƉůŝĞĚŵǇƐŽŶ
ǁŝƚŚĚƌƵŐƐ/ǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƐĂǀĞĚ ?ŝƐƚƌƵĞ ?ƵƚŝƚƐ contingently true. So I might have been 
saved without you doing as you did. If we read Wallace as claiming that the affirming of one thing 
and the regretting of another is only possible where the one is not causally necessary for the other 
as involving the strong form of causal necessity that demands a noncontingent causal linkage, it 
ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĂƉƉůǇƚŽĂĐĂƐĞůŝŬĞ the house explosion. But that does not seem to be how Wallace reads it. 
For Wallace pretty clearly does think the problem arises in cases like the broken promise-crashed 
plane case and here too the causal connection is evidently contingent. There are countless ways the 
desired outcome of my missing the plane could have happened without your having broken any 
promises. Here and elsewhere, Wallace seems to be adopting the weak reading where it is enough 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ? “,ĂĚyŶŽƚŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚ ?zǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚ ?ďĞƚƌƵĞ ?ƵƚƚŚĂƚďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞ
case seems perfectly consistent with our having enough independence in play  “ƚŽĞŶĂďůĞƵƐƚŽĨŽƌŵ
counterfactual thoughts about one object ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?ĂƐŝŶĚĞĞĚ/ŚĂǀĞũƵƐƚďĞĞŶĚŽŝŶŐ ?
3. 
It all gets much trickier when we turn to one of his central examples. The example is already famous 
ĨƌŽŵWĂƌĨŝƚ ?Ɛ discussion of the so-called non-identity problem4 A 14-year old girl choses to conceive 
and have a child. This ?ůĞƚ ?ƐĂŐƌĞĞ ĨŽƌĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƐĂŬĞ, she should not do. It is wrong to bring a child 
into the world when one lacks the maturity to raise it as well as one should. This is not only wrong 
prudentially, it is wrong morally. Of course the child is not worse off than had he never existed and 
so is not harmed and may have no complaint because his very existence depends on the wrong in 
question but there is still plausibly a wrong done, just as we would plausibly do a wrong if (the other 
famous Parfit example
5
) our descendants live difficult and harsh lives because we have despoiled 
their environment even if their very identities depend on our having so despoiled it.  
The problem is that as her life continues with her son, both she and her son will want to affirm his 
life. But how can they if they are to deplore, as it seems they should, the decision to conceive and 
raise him? And here there is a worry as the causal link is at least arguably less contingent.  The 
woman could have had a child by waiting till she was in a better position to be a mother, but she 
could not have had that child the son whose existence she now affirms. To have that child she would 
have had to become pregnant just when she did. (Of course that can be disputed. Claims about the 
necessity of origin take us onto extremely vexed  metaphysical waters ǁŚŝĐŚ/ǁŽŶ ?ƚƚƌǇƚŽŶĂǀŝŐĂƚĞ
here.) 
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Crucially though, the manoeuvring of epistemic perspective ƚŚĂƚŚĞůƉĞĚŝŶŽƚŚĞƌĐĂƐĞƐǁŽŶ ?ƚso 
clearly help here. Once the child is born and living his life the mother loves him and will want to 
affirm his life as indeed will he. She is glad, profoundly glad, that Martin exists and so is Martin 
himself. At the time of conception she did not yet have this de re attachment to him of course. But 
she knew that she would. Or could at least be very confident. Things can go wrong here.  “You all 
want to know something ?tĞůů ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚůŝŬĞ>ĞŽ ?DǇǀĞƌǇŽǁŶƐŽŶĂŶĚ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚůŝŬĞŚŝŵ ? ?declares 
Birdie Hubbard in HellmĂŶ ?Ɛ “dŚĞ>ŝƚƚůĞ&ŽǆĞƐ ?, understandably enough, of her horrible child.6 But 
mothers are famously good as loving often even offspring others find it hard to love so we can take it 
as a fairly safe bet that the young girl will affirm her son ?ƐĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽŶĐĞ he exists. And her having 
ƚŚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŵĂŬĞǁŚĂƚƐŚĞĚŝĚĂŶǇůĞƐƐǁƌŽŶŐ ?&ŽƌŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞƐŚĞǁŽƵůĚhave had 
a similar de re attachment to the other children she might instead have had at later times. 
The case is not like the air crash case in that we cannot claim there is new information on the table 
that has changed everything. But there is a new attachment and might it not be plausible to treat 
that as having comparable significance. It may help here to consider a case which is similar in 
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞďƵƚǁŚŝĐŚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƌĂŝƐĞǀĞǆĂƚŝŽƵƐŝƐƐƵĞƐŽĨŶŽŶ-identity.  
Consider a strange imaginary race, the Strangers. Among us Strangers, we marry strangers. Perhaps 
we post profiles on the internet and when we see one that interests us we negotiate and investigate 
through family members without our ever meeting or directly communicating before the wedding 
where we will meet and talk for the first time. Surprisingly perhaps, this works rather well for these 
folk. Almost everyone who gets married in this way forms a strong and lasting loving attachment to 
their partner. Now here I am wondering whether it is a good idea to marry Bertha. I know that if I do 
so I will most likely come to love her. And that will be a reason, later on, retrospectively to affirm 
having married her, if I do. But it is not now a reason to marry her rather than someone else. For I 
know I will acquire, with equal likelihood, a similar retrospective reason for affirmation of my 
marriage to anyone else I might marry instead. Plausibly it seems to me, the fact that I will love 
Bertha if I marry her, does not count as a reason, before I marry her, for my doing so; but does very 
much count as a reason, after I have married her:  my present and actual love for her then gives me 
a very strong reason retrospectively to affirm my having done so. So new attachments, new 
emotions, have the capacity to transform the normative situation no less radically than do new facts.  
Can the young girl affirm, in Wallace ?ƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨŚĞƌĐŚŝůĚǁŚŝůĞŶŽƚĂĨĨŝƌŵŝŶŐ ?in the 
ƐĂŵĞƐĞŶƐĞ ?ŚĞƌŚĂǀŝŶŐďĞŐƵŶŚŝƐůŝĨĞǁŚĞŶƐŚĞǁĂƐƐŽǀĞƌǇǇŽƵŶŐ ?tĞ ?ůůĐŽŵĞďĂĐŬƚŽƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ
how much this matters. But even if it does, there may be more room for manoeuvre than Wallace 
allows. At one point in his discussion of her case, he writes: 
dŚĞǇŽƵŶŐŐŝƌů ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽŚĂǀĞĂĐŚŝůĚŝƐĂŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚŝƐŽďũĞĐƚŽĨ
ĂĨĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƉĞƌƐŽŶƐŝŵƉůǇǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĞǆŝƐƚĞĚŝĨƚŚĞŐŝƌůŚĂĚ
decided to postpone conception by more than a few weeks. At least this is the case so long 
as we abstract from the possibility of deploying techniques of assisted reproduction, such as 
ƚŚĞĐƌǇŽƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞǇŽƵŶŐŐŝƌů ?ƐĨĞƌƚŝůŝǌĞĚĞŐŐĐĞůůƐ ?ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐǁŚŝĐŚǁĞĐĂŶ
reasonably assume not to have been real options for the girl in this particular scenario. (144) 
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That little complication is quite interesting. For while we may very credibly build into the imagined 
situation the unavailability of cryopreservation that would have made it possible for that very child 
to have been raised from birth by a biological mother mature enough to raise it better than her 
teenage self could, quite literally by putting him on ice, that unavailability is plausibly not going to 
obtain by metaphysical necessity ŝŶƚŚĞǁĂǇƚŚĂƚĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐŚĂǀŝŶŐďĞĞŶĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚďǇƚŚĂƚŐŝƌůĂƚƚŚĂƚ
time might be thought to obtain by metaphysical necessity. So the counterfactual thoughts we need 
are available. It is wonderful that Martin exists, we all think, but if only some technique had been 
available to let his mother raise him later on when she is an adult. If only that had been the case, he 
could have come into the world without her doing something wrong. So we can deplore what we 
need to deplore and affirm what we need to affirm and it is all fine.
7
  
4.  
We may still be troubled by my opening example of the connection between our own existence and 
the two world wars. Or by the other Parfitian case where our descendants owe their existence to our 
despoiling the world. These are both particularised versions of the case Wallace closes with, which is 
a more general thought that all of our livĞƐĂƌĞĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚŝŶǁŚĂƚŚĞĐĂůůƐ “ƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞƌǁŽƌůĚŽĨ
ůĂŵĞŶƚĂďůĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ? ?dŚĞĐĂƵƐĂůŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĞƐƚŚĂƚůĞĚƚŽŵǇďŝƌƚŚĂŶĚƚŽǇŽƵƌƐĂƌĞ ?ǁŚĞŶǁĞůĞƚŽƵƌ
imagination loose on the question, vast and in large measure inscrutable, going back a long way, all 
the way back to when there was no back. And over those long histories, a lot of very bad stuff has 
happened, including plausibly some stuff that is unaffirmably bad  W perhaps in the way the child torn 
to pieces by dogs in The Brother Karamazov is, we might take Dostoevsky to be suggesting, 
unaffirmably bad.
8
 This forces us, he argues, into the tragic, as he has it, ŶŝŚŝůŝƐƚŝĐ ? “ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ
the affirmative attitude we assume by default [to our own lives] is not one that ultimately makes 
ƐĞŶƐĞ ? ?(256) 
/ ?ŵŶot too troubled by this. There is a possible thought I could want to have which is the thought 
where I affirm my own life and with it the whole calamitous causal history of the world that has 
ĨŝŶĂůůǇŝƐƐƵĞĚŝŶŝƚ ?/ĂŵŚĂƉƉǇĞŶŽƵŐŚƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚƚŚĂƚ/ĐĂŶ ?ƚƌeally affirm that ďƵƚ/ ?ŵŶŽƚƐƵƌĞŝĨ/
ĐĂƌĞ ?tĂůůĂĐĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “ŶǆŝĞƚǇĂďŽƵƚŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?ŽŶƚŚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌ ƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝƚ ?ĚĞƌŝǀĞƐĨƌŽŵŽƵƌ
recognition that the deep aspiration to live lives that are worthy of unconditional affirmation may 
not be realizable at thĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞĚĂǇ ? ?(257) Ƶƚ/ ?ŵŶŽƚƐƵƌĞby now I have this aspiration to go in 
for this very specifically characterised attitude to my own life, or, if I do, that it is very deep, the 
ŵŽƌĞƐŽĂƐtĂůůĂĐĞ ?ƐŽǁŶĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽŶůǇŵĂŬĞƐĐůĞĂƌŚŽǁŽĚĚƚŚŝƐĂƚƚŝtude would be. I deplore, to 
be sure,  the awfulness of all the awful things in human history albeit in the rather idle and impotent 
way which is all most of us can manage in the face of something so huge and, to a great extent, so 
remote from us. But that ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƉƌĞĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŵǇĂĨĨŝƌŵŝŶŐŵǇůŝĨĞŝŶŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞǁĂǇƐ
we have distinguished ĂŶĚŝƚ ?ƐĨĂƌĨƌŽŵĐůĞĂƌƚŽŵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĂƚŝƐŶ ?ƚĂĨĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĞŶŽƵŐŚ. I can be glad I 
am alive in the sense that I want my life to continue and am glad it has continued hitherto. I can be 
pleased with my life in the sense of being pleased at it having going well compared to other ways it 
might have gone. I can take moral pride in how I have lived. I can be glad I came into being rather 
than the various other things that might have happened around the time of my birth, vis a vis who 
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did and did not come into being around then. I can do all this without feeling any pressure to revise 
my judgement that the Carthaginian Wars (say) were a pretty horrendous business, consistently with 
recognizing the last 14 billion years or so having been the ghastly and lamentable catalogue of 
misfortune that it has. dŚĞƌĞŵĂǇďĞĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ “ĂĨĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂĨĨŝƌŵŝŶŐŵǇŽǁŶůŝĨĞŽƌƚŚĞ
lives of those I love requires me to take the same stance to such remote historical events but that 
very requirement seems to warrant considerable scepticism about how essential that rather special 
attitude really is to make sense of either my positive evaluation of my own life or my loving 
attachments to others.  
It helps here to recall here another possibility, noted above, that Wallace himself raises in the 
opening chapter and perhaps insufficiently pursues in those that follow. We affirm what the 
ĨŝƌĞĨŝŐŚƚĞƌĚŽĞƐǁŚŝůĞĚĞƉůŽƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĨŝƌĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ? “ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ?ŚŝƐ ?ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽ
a set of circumstances that confront the agent as a matter of facticity. ? ? ? ?-5) Quite. And in a 
footnote WallacĞĂůůŽǁƐ P “KŶĞĐĂŶ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂůƐŽĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇĂĨĨŝƌŵƚŚŝŶŐƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞŶŽƚĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?/Ŷ
ũƵƐƚƚŚŝƐǁĂǇƐƵƌĞůǇ ?ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŝŶĂůůŝƚƐůĂŵĞŶƚĂďůĞŶĂƐƚŝŶĞƐ ?ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚƐƵƐĂůů “ĂƐĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨĨĂĐƚŝĐŝƚǇ ? 
It is abundantly possible for those who find themselves facing life in the aftermath of wars or 
environmental catastrophe or just the whole long bloody lamentable mess of history to see 
themselves as confronted with a challenge to which they hope their lives can be, among other things 
they may want them to be, an honourable and intelligent response. Living lives that rise well to that 
challenge will surely leave them with plenty to affirm without feeling much pressure to lapse into 
nihilism. 
/ ?ůůĞŶĚǁŝƚŚĂĨŝŶĂů ?ƐƉĞĐƵůĂƚŝǀĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ĨƚĞƌƚŚĞ appalling Great Chemical War of 2051-2060, there 
were many big toxic lakes of chemicals left around from the terrible weapons that had wiped out 
huge populations. Living on among the ruins, I and some of my fellow survivors figure out a clever 
way of harvesting these chemicals and using them to make stuff that we can use to vaccinate the 
children against the terrible disease that everyone has been dying off since the war ended. This is 
good work in which we take some pride. Of course had it not been for the great chemical war we 
would not be doing this and the GCW was really properly horrible. But can we and do we 
nonetheless want to affirm what we are doing and the lives we devote to doing it? Well, yes.
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